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UNNECESSARY DEATHS AND UNNECESSARY 
COSTS: GETTING PATENTED DRUGS TO 
PATIENTS MOST IN NEED 
Erin M. Anderson* 
Abstract: Medical epidemics that are constrained in the developed world 
are wrecking havoc on developing countries, which are bearing the brunt 
of HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, and other infectious diseases. Be-
cause medicines used to treat these conditions are patented, they are ex-
pensive and inaccessible to poor countries. In 1994, the United Nations 
established a system of international patent protection through the World 
Trade Organization’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS), and simultaneously tried to accommodate its 
commitment to making life-saving pharmaceuticals available to develop-
ing countries. When TRIPS failed to accomplish this goal, Article 31bis, 
an amendment to TRIPS, was introduced in 2003, seeking to make it eas-
ier for developing countries to acquire low-cost drugs. However, the 
amendment has been criticized and has largely gone unused. This Note 
addresses ways in which Article 31bis can be employed to deliver treat-
ment to the neediest. In particular, this Note advocates that, whether or 
not the amendment is used, life-saving drugs must be provided at low-cost 
to developing countries. 
Introduction 
 The poorest regions of the world have the highest concentrations 
of people with treatable diseases such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and 
malaria.1 Each year in developing countries, approximately three mil-
                                                                                                                      
* Managing Editor, Boston College Third World Law Journal (2008–2009). 
1 See UNAIDS & World Health Org., AIDS Epidemic Update 2 (2005), available at 
http://www.who.int/hiv/epi-update2005_en.pdf; World Health Org., Public Health, 
Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights: Report of the Commission on Intel-
lectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health 2–3 (2006) [hereinafter 
WHO, Public Health], available at http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/documents/ 
thereport/ENPublicHealthReport.pdf; World Health Org., Towards Universal Access: 
Scaling Up Priority HIV/AIDS Interventions in the Health Sector: Progress Re-
port 5 (2007) [hereinafter WHO, Towards Universal Access], available at http://www. 
who.int/hiv/mediacentre/universal_access_progress_report_en.pdf. Treatable diseases are 
also referred to as diseases of poverty, since they are most prevalent in poor countries but 
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lion people die from HIV/AIDS, two million from tuberculosis, and 
one million from malaria.2 Over two-thirds of all people infected with 
HIV live in sub-Saharan Africa.3 Seventy-two percent of the worldwide 
fatalities caused by HIV/AIDS occurred in this region.4 
 One reason for the disproportionate concentration is that one 
third of the world’s population—close to two billion people—lacks 
regular access to essential medicines.5 In the poorest regions, such as 
parts of Africa and Asia, approximately ninety-four percent of the in-
habitants fall into this category.6 In low- and middle-income countries, 
a full seventy-two percent of people have no access to antiretroviral 
treatments.7 A report by the World Health Organization (WHO) found 
that average per capita spending in low-income countries is one hun-
dred times less than what is spent in high-income countries.8 Further-
more, WHO reported that only fifteen percent of the world’s popula-
tion consumed up to ninety percent of all available pharmaceuticals.9 
                                                                                                                      
have often been cured or significantly combated in developed regions. See WHO, Public 
Health, supra, at 2. 
2 WHO, Public Health, supra note 1, at 8. Comparatively, in developed countries in 
2002 approximately 49,000 people died of HIV/AIDS, 49,000 of tuberculosis, and 150 of 
malaria. World Health Org., Revised Global Burden of Disease (GBD) 2002 Estimates: Estimates by 
Level of Development: Mortality, 2002, http://www.who.int/healthinfo/bodgbd2002revised/ 
en/index.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2008) [hereinafter WHO, Revised GBD 2002]. The World 
Bank classifies developing countries as having either low- or middle-incomes per capita. 
WHO, Public Health, supra note 1, at 2. Low-income countries have a per capita income of 
less than $825 and middle-income countries have a per capita income of $3255. Id. 
3 UNAIDS & World Health Org., supra note 1, at 10. 
4 Id. 
5 World Health Org., WHO Medicines Strategy: Countries at the Core 2004–
2007, at 3 (2004) [hereinafter WHO, WHO Medicines Strategy]; Bill Clinton, My Quest 
to Improve Care, Newsweek, May 15, 2006, at 50. 
6 WHO, WHO Medicines Strategy, supra note 5, at 3. 
7 WHO, Towards Universal Access, supra note 1, at 5. In December 2006, only two 
million of the seven million people suffering from HIV/AIDS in low- and middle-income 
countries received treatment. Id. 
8 WHO, WHO Medicines Strategy, supra note 5, at 3. Approximately four hundred 
dollars are spent per person in high-income countries as compared to four dollars per 
person in low-income countries. Id. It is important to note the interrelationship between 
health and wealth: an abundance of poor health contributes to status as a poor country, 
just as being a poor country translates into high concentrations of poor health. See Robert 
Langreth, The Rwanda Cure, Forbes, Oct. 29, 2007, at 142. For example, in examining the 
relationship between malaria and poverty, economist Jeffrey Sachs declared that a severe 
malaria problem reduced a country’s economic growth by 1.3 percentage points per year. 
Id. 
9 WHO, WHO Medicines Strategy, supra note 5, at 15. 
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 Studies show that improved access to medications would drastically 
alleviate the disproportionate death tolls in developing countries.10 
One set of researchers estimates that antiretroviral medicines (com-
bined with comprehensive treatment programs) could save between 5.8 
and 10.1 million lives in sub-Saharan Africa by 2020.11 That is, between 
sixteen and twenty–five percent of deaths caused by HIV/AIDS could 
be averted.12 It is further estimated that up to 10.5 million lives could 
be saved annually by providing existing medicines, commonplace in 
the developed world, that treat infectious diseases, maternal and peri-
natal conditions, childhood diseases, and noncommunicable diseases.13 
Another study found that of the 9.7 million deaths per year worldwide 
of children under the age of five years old, six million could be pre-
vented using existing technologies.14 As an example, generic antibiotics 
could cure almost all of the 1.8 million who die every year from bacte-
rial pneumonia.15 Further, the measles vaccination—which was in-
vented over forty years ago and has proven safe and reliable—can re-
duce the 390,000 deaths per year that that infliction causes.16 As it 
stands, over ninety-five percent of measles deaths occur in developing 
countries.17 
                                                                                                                      
10 See WHO, Public Health, supra note 1, at 8; John Salomon et al., Integrating HIV Preven-
tion and Treatment: From Slogans to Impact, 2 PLoS Medicine 50, 52 (2005), available at http:// 
medicine.plosjournals.org/archive/1549–1676/2/1/pdf/10.1371_journal.pmed.0020016-S. 
pdf; Michael Westerhaus & Arachu Castro, How Do Intellectual Property Law and International 
Trade Agreements Affect Access to Antiretroviral Therapy?, 3 PLoS Medicine 1230, 1232 (2006). 
11 Salomon et al., supra note 10, at 53. 
12 Id. 
13 WHO, WHO Medicines Strategy, supra note 5, at 13. Another example is exami-
nation of the town of Mayange, Rwanda. Langreth, supra note 8. Until 2006, over 100 chil-
dren per year under the age of five were dying in their homes because they could not af-
ford the town’s eighteen-bed clinic. Id. In 2007, a functioning health center was started to 
provide basic services such as generic antibiotics, rehydration fluids for diarrhea, malaria 
medicines, insecticide-treated bed nets, and AIDS drugs. Id. As a result, in 2007, only 
twenty-eight children under the age of five died. Id. 
14 Langreth, supra note 8. 
15 Id. 
16 Id.; Muhammad Saleem, Measles Still a Leading Cause of Death Among Children, Bus. 
Recorder, Mar. 1, 2008, available at http://www.brecorder.com (search “Measles Still a 
Leading” and follow hyperlink) (“Measles vaccination, one of the most cost-effective public 
health interventions, is available for preventing death caused by the disease.”). The mea-
sles vaccination was invented in 1963. Langreth, supra note 8. 
17 Saleem, supra note 16. 
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 There are many reasons why developing countries are unable to 
obtain the medicines their people need.18 Among the leading factors 
are high costs.19 Cutting-edge drugs are usually patented and are 
therefore prohibitively expensive because the patent-holder is free to 
price the drug without limits.20 
 Patents on pharmaceuticals in the international arena are gener-
ally governed by the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).21 
This agreement confers on the patent owner a series of traditional 
intellectual property rights (IPRs), one of which is a twenty-year li-
cense to prevent third parties from making, using, offering for sale, 
selling, or importing the patented product or process.22 Because this 
grants a two-decade monopoly to the patent holder, the drugs can be 
sold at lucrative prices free from competition and allegations of anti-
                                                                                                                      
18 Langreth, supra note 8. Columbia professor Joshua Ruxin, who runs the clinic in 
Mayange, lamented that “the hardest truth for people to come to terms with is that the 
practical solutions are already out there, but they are not being applied.” Id. 
19 See WHO, Towards Universal Access, supra note 1, at 61. In developing countries, 
medicines account for twenty-five to seventy percent of total health expenditures. WHO, 
WHO Medicines Strategy, supra note 5, at 14. In most high-income countries, medicines 
only account for fifteen percent of health care costs. Id. There is, however, existing litera-
ture that argues that patent protection is not the number one impediment to accessing 
antiretroviral drug treatment in African countries. Amir Attaran & Lee Gillespie-White, Do 
Patents for Antiretroviral Drugs Constrain Access to AIDS Treatment in Africa?, 286 JAMA 1886, 
1890 (2001). “It is doubtful that patents are to blame for the lack of access to antiretroviral 
drugs in most African countries.” Id. 
20 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex 1C, 
arts. 27–34, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS]; Frederick M. Abbott & 
Jerome H. Reichman, The Doha Round’s Public Health Legacy: Strategies for the Production and 
Diffusion of Patented Medicines Under the Amended TRIPS Provision, 10 J. Int’l Econ. L. 921, 
971 (2007) (noting the theory that there is no incentive to set low prices because there is 
no competition). 
21 TRIPS, supra note 20, at 27–34. The WTO is an international organization govern-
ing trade laws globally. See generally WTO, www.wto.org, (last visited Oct. 10, 2008). As of 
July 2008, 153 countries were members. Id. The TRIPS agreement covers the seven princi-
pal facets of intellectual property: copyright, trademark, geographical indications, indus-
trial designs, patents, layout designs of integrated circuits, and undisclosed information 
including trade secrets. J. Michael Finger, The WTO’s Special Burden on Less Developed Coun-
tries. 19 Cato J. 425, 429 (2000) available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj19n3/ 
cj19n3–9.pdf. Additionally, TRIPS requires some protection of plant varieties. Id. 
22 TRIPS, supra note 20, arts. 28(1)(a) and 33. 
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trust violations.23 However, such right results in high prices which in 
turn prevent poor countries from purchasing the patented drugs.24 
 To accommodate needy countries to which IPRs have a detrimen-
tal effect, TRIPS carves out certain exceptions.25 Article 31—titled, 
Other Use Without Authorization of the Right Holder—confers to a 
member-state the right to use “the subject matter of a patent without 
the authorization of the right holder.”26 Under Article 31(f), a WTO 
member may bypass a patent holder’s rights in order to create low-
cost generic drugs under a set of conditions, most notably that “such 
use shall be authorized predominantly for the supply of the domestic 
market” of that member.27 
 Such a provision sounds promising, but, unfortunately, the limita-
tion of this exception, that domestic production can only be for domes-
tic use, has proven unworkable for most developing countries that are 
the neediest.28 A member-state is only permitted to bypass the patents 
of its own domestic rights holders and subsequently distribute and use 
the products domestically.29 Yet most countries in need do not have 
pharmaceutical manufacturers within their borders.30 And those mem-
ber-countries that are home to manufacturers are forbidden from ex-
porting them.31 In 2003, the WTO General Council set out to address 
this paradox and proposed an amendment to Article 31.32 The amend-
ment, Article 31bis, allows developed countries to export to developing 
countries where there is a national health problem.33 
 This Note examines the palpable conundrum of developing coun-
tries that are overcome with death and suffering induced by an inability 
both to treat diseases that are treatable in the developed world and to 
                                                                                                                      
23 See id.; Bruce H. Schneider & Matthew W. Siegal, New Challenges of Proving “Market 
Power” in Patent Tying Cases, 18 Prac. Litigator 13, 18(2007) available at http://files.ali-
aba.org/thumbs/datastorage/lacidoirep/articles/PLIT_PLIT0703-SCHNEIDER-
SIEGAL_thumb.pdf. 
24 WHO, Towards Universal Access, supra note 1, at 6. 
25 TRIPS, supra note 20, art. 30. 
26 Id. art. 31. 
27 Id. art. 31(f). 
28 See World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 
of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Decla-
ration]. 
29 TRIPS, supra note 20, art. 31(f). 
30 WHO, Public Health, supra note 1, at 120, 152. 
31 TRIPS, supra note 20, art. 31(f). 
32 World Trade Organization (WTO) General Council, Implementation of Paragraph 
6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, ¶ 2, WT/L/540 
(Aug. 30, 2003) [hereinafter WTO General Council]. 
33 See id. 
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obtain medications that could easily be made available. Part I highlights 
the concentration of treatable diseases in developing countries and ex-
plores why these regions are unable to access fundamental treatments. 
Part II outlines the United Nations’ (U.N.) process of establishing a 
system of international patent protection through TRIPS, while simul-
taneously trying to accommodate its commitment to making life-saving 
pharmaceuticals available to developing countries. Part III outlines the 
progression of Article 31bis, an amendment to TRIPS that seeks to 
make it easier for developing countries to acquire low-cost drugs.34 This 
section also looks at why the amendment is not being used. Part IV ex-
plores ways in which Article 31bis can be employed, directly and indi-
rectly, to get treatment to the people who need it most. In particular, 
this Note advocates that in order to treat curable disease, developing 
countries must be able to afford the treatment that has proven to be 
life-saving in developed parts of the world. 
I. How Patent Law Affects World Health 
A. The Disparity in World Disease 
 People in developing countries are dying in large numbers from 
diseases and medical conditions that have proven to be preventable or 
treatable in developed countries.35 In these countries, over half of all 
deaths are caused by communicable maternal, perinatal, and nutri-
tional conditions.36 Thirty-four percent of all deaths are caused by in-
fectious and parasitic diseases, such as HIV/AIDS.37 In comparison, 
infectious and parasitic diseases—diseases that usually can be easily 
treated or prevented—account for only two percent of deaths in devel-
                                                                                                                      
34 “Bis” means two times in number or amount. Oxford Latin Dictionary 234–35 
(1983). In this context, Article 31bis is a provision that comes after Article 31. Press Re-
lease, World Trade Org., Members OK Amendment to Make Health Flexibility Permanent 
(Dec. 6, 2005) [hereinafter WTO Dec. 6, 2005], available at http://www.wto.org/english/ 
news_e/pres05_e/pr426_e.htm. 
35 See Salomon et al., supra note 10, at 54. 
36 WHO, Revised GBD 2002, supra note 2. Communicable maternal, perinatal, and nu-
tritional conditions include: infectious and parasitic diseases, respiratory infections, ma-
ternal conditions (including maternal hemorrhage, maternal sepsis, hypertensive disor-
ders, and obstructed labor), perinatal conditions (including low birth weight, and birth 
asphyxia/trauma), and nutritional deficiencies (including protein-energy malnutrition, 
vitamin A deficiency, and iron-deficiency anemia). Id. 
37 Id. Infectious and parasitic diseases include tuberculosis, STDs, diarrheal diseases, 
childhood cluster diseases (including pertussis, poliomyelitis, diphtheria, measles, and 
tetanus), meningitis, and hepatitis B and C. Id. 
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oped countries.38 Instead, the top trigger of death in developed coun-
tries, answering for eighty-six percent of all deaths, is noncommunica-
ble diseases, including cardiovascular disease and cancers, conditions 
that have limited or no prevention or treatment.39 
B. Accessibility of Medicines for Treatable Conditions 
 People in developing countries are dying from treatable diseases 
because they cannot access the medicines that are needed to prevent or 
remedy these conditions.40 Domestic conditions, such as poverty and 
insufficient health infrastructure, poor drug quality, inadequate na-
tional health policies, understaffed clinics and hospitals, lack of politi-
cal commitment, and under-financing of treatment programs are com-
monly-cited obstacles that inhibit access.41 
 Cost is the forefront barrier to accessing necessary medicines.42 
Developing countries simply cannot afford innovative medicines.43 It 
is lack of competition, more often than not, which drives up prices, 
and it is patent law that confers monopolistic rights to the creators of 
these medicines, thus allowing the creators to set prices without re-
straint.44 Absent patent rights, patent-holders would be constrained by 
antitrust laws that prohibit monopolies and artificial price-setting.45 
Competitors could acquire or reverse-manufacture recipes for drugs 
and introduce competition to the market, thus driving down prices.46 
 Examining current AIDS treatment in developing countries illus-
trates one aspect of the patent problem.47 First-line AIDS drugs, ther-
apy that was first introduced over fifteen years ago, have improved and 
                                                                                                                      
38 Id.; Salomon et al., supra note 10, at 54. 
39 WHO, Revised GBD 2002, supra note 2. 
40 See Westerhaus & Castro, supra note 10, at 1232. There are other reasons that devel-
oping countries suffer the most from infectious diseases, including the lack of sanitary 
conditions that facilitate the spread of communicable disease. Mary Gail Hare, Carroll Re-
lief Group Receives $25 Million; U.S. Grant to Support Health Care in Congo, Balt. Sun, Aug. 11, 
2001, at 1A. 
41 Attaran & Gillespie-White, supra note 19, at 1890; Westerhaus & Castro, supra note 
10, at 1232. 
42 See, e.g., WHO, Public Health, supra note 1, at 112. 
43 Attaran & Gillespie-White, supra note 19, at 1891; Westerhaus & Castro, supra note 
10, at 1232. Ghana, Nigeria, and Tanzania have annual national health care budgets of 
only eight dollars or less per capita. Attaran & Gillespie-White, supra note 19, at 1891. 
44 See Abbott & Reichman, supra note 20, at 971. 
45 Thomas Chen, Exclusivity Periods and Authorized Generic Drugs, Health Law Week, 
Nov. 9, 2007, at 33; see Schneider & Siegal, supra note 23, at 18. 
46 Abbott & Reichman, supra note 20, at 927–28. 
47 See Lara Santoro, Forget the Patents on AIDS Drugs: Third World Nations Have the Right, 
and the Duty, to Produce Generic Versions, L.A. Times, Oct. 9, 2007, at 17. 
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extended the lives of countless citizens in developing countries.48 But, 
over the years, many AIDS patients have developed resistance to the old 
antiretrovirals and now require newer, updated drugs.49 Unfortunately, 
second- and third-line AIDS drugs are presently protected by patents 
and are essentially inaccessible to patients who cannot pay the exorbi-
tant costs.50 Without access to these successive drugs, people die while 
waiting for patents to expire.51 Buddhima Lokuge, the United States 
manager of Doctors Without Borders, characterizes such a situation as 
“starting from zero again,” since the earlier, first-line treatment went to 
waste because the subsequent treatments are not available to these pa-
tients for financial reasons.52 
II. The International Approach to Patented medicines 
A. The Push for International Patent Regulation 
 One reason pharmaceutical patent holders set prices high is be-
cause there is a market that is willing, and financially able, to buy.53 Par-
tially as a result of patent protection permitting high prices, many poor 
countries have refused to recognize pharmaceutical patent rights alto-
gether.54 Some of these are countries only marginally concerned with 
patent protection because little research and development, an activity 
IPRs seek to ensure, occurs within their borders.55 However, one effect 
of such disregard for patents is to make patent-holders resistant to sell 
                                                                                                                      
48 Id. 
49 Mark A. Wainberg & Gerald Friedland, Public Health Implications of Antiretroviral 
Therapy and HIV Drug Resistance, 279 JAMA 1977, 1977 (1998). 
50 Alexander G. Higgins, Canada Tells WTO It Will Be First to Export Cheap, Generic AIDS 
Drugs, Oct. 5, 2007, http://www.aegis.com/news/ads/2007/AD072099.html. 
51 WHO, Public Health, supra note 1, at 112; see Wainberg & Friedland, supra note 
49, at 1980. Strict adherence to antiretroviral therapy is essential to successful treatment. 
Wainberg & Friedland, supra ntoe 49, at 1980. Using less than effective combinations also 
lowers achievement rates. Id. 
52 Santoro, supra note 47. 
53 Abbott & Reichman, supra note 20, at 971. Patent holders can set high prices be-
cause there is lack of competition, and there is a market of affluent persons, even in devel-
oping countries, that makes their businesses profitable. Id. 
54 See Carlos M. Correa, Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: 
A Commentary on the TRIPS Agreement 271 (2007). Prior to 1994, approximately fifty 
countries did not recognize IPRs with respect to medicines. Id. Other countries recognized 
patent rights on the process of making the medicine, but not on the resulting product. See, e.g., 
Parliament Amends Patent Law, Facts on File World News Digest, Mar. 31, 2005, at 215B1. 
55 See Raj Bawa, Nanotechnology Patent Proliferation and the Crisis at the U.S. Patent Office, 
17 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 699, 713 (2007). 
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their medicines in these countries.56 Such holders have argued that fu-
ture research and development will be stifled because their companies 
will be unable to recover costs.57 Though international patent protec-
tion dates back to the 1883 Paris Convention, it was not until a century 
later that the international community’s interest in worldwide stan-
dards of patentability—commonly known as patent law harmoniza-
tion—piqued.58 Prior to this time, developed countries had little inter-
est in working with the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO), the entity entrusted with facilitating harmonization.59 
 However, due to the growing disregard for patent rights, large 
multinational corporations (MNCs) began to lobby for international 
protection, looking for tight regulation and strict standards, while de-
veloping countries argued for minimal provisions.60 The MNCs of the 
developed countries made headway on their quest when, in the mid-
1980s, the U.N. publicized its intention to revise the existing interna-
tional trade agreement, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), and received universal support.61 
                                                                                                                      
56 Bernard Pécoul et al., Access to Essential Drugs in Developing Countries: A Lost Battle?, 
281 JAMA 361, 365 (1999). 
57 Correa, supra note 54, at 275. Companies were also worried about parallel importa-
tion, which occurs when a manufacturer sells a drug to poor country A for price X, and A 
sells the drug to developed country B for a price slightly higher than X, but less than Y, 
which is the amount the manufacturer charges B for the same drug. See Sisule F. 
Musungu & Cecilia Oh, Comm’n on Intellectual Prop. Rights, Innovation & Pub. 
Health (CIPRIH), The Use of Flexibilities in TRIPS by Developing Countries: Can 
They Promote Access to Medicines? 27 (2005). 
58 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 
1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention]; Robert P. Merges et al., Intel-
lectual Property in the New Technological Age 346 (2007). The Paris Convention 
chiefly concerned mapping out procedures for filing for patent protection in multiple 
countries. Paris Convention, supra, art. 4. 
59 Merges et al., supra note 58, at 346. Western businesses considered the WIPO to be 
unfriendly to their interests. Id. The WIPO was established in July 1967 as a specialized 
agency of the U.N. World Trade Org., Frequently Asked Questions About TRIPS in the 
WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/tripfq_e.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 
2008) [hereinafter WTO, FAQs]. Its objective is “to promote intellectual property protec-
tion throughout the world through cooperation among states and, where appropriate, in 
collaboration with any other international organization.” Id. 
60 See Jason Nardi, The TRIPS Traps for Health and Knowledge, Inter. Press Serv. News 
Agency, Dec. 19, 2005, available at http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=31487. Mul-
tinational pharmaceutical corporations, often based in the United States or Western 
Europe, played a significant role in the development of international law. Id. Some activists 
claim that the resulting international agreement “was introduced against the will of devel-
oping countries, under the pressure of multinational companies from the U.S. and Japan.” 
Id. 
61 Id. The resulting international agreement was developed according to the model of 
existing patent rights in industrialized, developed countries. Finger, supra note 21, at 430. 
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B. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual  
Property Rights (TRIPS) 
 In late 1993, at the end of the Uruguay Round of negotiations on 
this matter, representatives announced both the creation of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) and the implementation of the Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).62 
The objective of the WTO, an organization established to replace the 
GATT, is to “help trade flow smoothly, freely, fairly and predictably.”63 
The purpose of TRIPS is to “contribute to the promotion of techno-
logical innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, 
to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological 
knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, 
and to a balance of rights and obligations.”64 
 TRIPS—which came into force on January 1, 1995—provides 
strong protection for all types of IPRs, including copyrights, trade-
marks, industrial designs, patents, and undisclosed information.65 The 
agreement requires members to comply with certain minimum stan-
dards for the protection of IPRs, but members are free to implement 
laws that give more extensive protection.66 Obligations apply equally to 
all member-states, but developing and least-developed countries have 
                                                                                                                      
This places a burden on developing countries in the form of implementation costs (or, 
alternatively, building a defense against adopting it). Id. at 430–31; Merges et al., supra 
note 58, at 346. The GATT was instituted in 1947 and did not cover IPRs in its framework. 
WTO, FAQs, supra note 59. 
62 TRIPS, supra note 20; Merges et al., supra note 58, at 347. 
63 World Trade Org., The WTO in Brief (2007), available at http://www.wto.org/eng- 
lish/res_e/doload_e/inbr_e.pdf. 
64 TRIPS, supra note 20, art. 7. 
65 WTO, FAQs, supra note 59. See generally TRIPS, supra note 20, art. 7. Important pro-
visions of TRIPS, as it relates to patents, include: testing patent applications for both the 
presence of an inventive step and industrial application, including almost all commercial 
fields within the ambit of patentable subject matter (including pharmaceutical patents), 
including the right of the patent-holder to control the market for imports of the patented 
product, and eliminating the practice of granting compulsory licenses for patented tech-
nology. Id. arts. 27–28. These changes most affected the laws of developing countries. 
Merges et al., supra note 58, at 347. Important provisions of TRIPS that conflicted with 
U.S. law include: extending the patent term to twenty years (as opposed to seventeen), 
opening up the “first-to-invent” system by allowing members of the WTO to introduce 
evidence of inventive acts in their home country for purposes of establishing priority, and 
expanding the definition of infringement to include acts of unauthorized offering for sale 
and importing. Id. 
66 Finger, supra note 21, at 430; WTO, FAQs, supra note 59. TRIPS is often character-
ized as a “minimum standards” agreement. Id. This means that each member must insti-
tute at least the specified levels of protection, but is free to provide more protection. Fin-
ger, supra note 21, at 430. 
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been permitted extra time to implement the changes.67 With regards to 
patents, one of the key purposes in creating TRIPS was to recognize the 
interest for patent protection for food, beverage, and medicinal prod-
ucts.68 The resulting TRIPS provisions on patents, set out in Articles 
27–34, are largely a result of the pharmaceutical industry’s ability to 
convince lawmakers to link intellectual property and trade matters.69 
C. Article 31: Compulsory Licensing 
 TRIPS has significant ramifications for pharmaceutical compa-
nies.70 Principally, it requires patent protection for pharmaceuticals, a 
right that drug-makers in certain countries did not previously have.71 
Moreover, TRIPS significantly extends the period under which drugs 
are inaccessible to those in developing countries.72 Such protection, 
while hailed by patent-holders, has had devastating effects on some 
countries.73 A study that looked at the impact of introducing patents 
on four domestic antibiotics in India (which recently had to come 
into international compliance) found that the total annual welfare 
losses would be nearly $305 million, a loss caused by price increases 
and access limits.74 Fortunately for these countries, in the midst of 
these rights, TRIPS provides an important exception to patent protec-
tion for pharmaceuticals.75 Article 31 allows temporary suspension of 
                                                                                                                      
67 Merges et al., supra note 58, at 347. Least-developed countries have until 2016 to 
make the transition. Westerhaus & Castro, supra note 10, at 1230–31. “Least developed” 
countries are designated based on U.N. indicators including income, nutrition, health, 
education, literacy, and economic vulnerability. Id. The criteria for this designation are 
available at http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrlls/ldc/ldc%20criteria.htm. Id. at 1235 n.5. 
Industrial countries had until January 1996 to conform to TRIPS’ standards, and develop-
ing and transition economies had until January 2000. Finger, supra note 21, at 429 n.2. The 
WTO has 109 developing and transition economy members. Id. at 435. 
68 Correa, supra note 54, at 271. 
69 TRIPS, supra note 20, arts. 27–34; Correa, supra note 54, at 271. 
70 See TRIPS, supra note 20, arts. 27–34. 
71 Id. art. 27; Correa, supra note 54, at 271. When TRIPS was negotiated, about fifty 
countries did not grant patent protection to pharmaceuticals. Id. 
72 TRIPS, supra note 20, art. 33; Peng Jiang, Comment, Fighting the Aids Epidemic: 
China’s Options Under the WTO TRIPS Agreement, 13 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 223, 228–29 
(2002). 
73 See Shubham Chaudhuri et al., The Effects of Extending Intellectual Property Rights Protec-
tion to Developing Countries: A Case Study of the Indian Pharmaceutical Market 35 (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10159, 2003), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/W10159. 
74 Id. 
75 TRIPS, supra note 20, art. 31. 
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a patent holder’s claims in cases of national or extreme emergency.76 
Such an exception is known as a compulsory license.77 Compulsory 
licensing—authorization by a government to use a patented product 
absent an owner’s permission—is one way to ensure availability of cut-
ting-edge drugs in nations that are unable to afford them.78 
 Certain conditions accompany such use.79 The proposed user must 
“[make] efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on rea-
sonable commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts have 
not been successful within a reasonable period of time.”80 Yet, “in the 
case of a national emergency or other circumstance of extreme ur-
gency” the above-mentioned requirement may be bypassed, as long as 
the right holder is “notified as soon as reasonably practical.”81 
 Unfortunately, Article 31 also imposes a condition that has ren-
dered the provision essentially useless to many developing countries.82 
Article 31(f) limits use to situations “predominantly for the supply of 
the domestic market of the Member authorizing such use.”83 That is, a 
country may issue a compulsory license only to a domestic manufac-
turer.84 This creates a precarious situation, because the countries that 
need the drugs the most are countries that do not have manufactur-
ing capabilities.85 Under this provision, compulsory export licenses 
cannot be conferred upon non-domestic suppliers, and manufactur-
ers in one country cannot infringe on a patent in order to supply an-
other country in need.86 Accordingly, Article 31 has not been used by 
those who need low-cost drugs the most.87 
                                                                                                                      
76 Id. art. 31(b). 
77 Id. 
78 James Packard Love, Knowledge Ecology Int’l, Recent Examples of the Use 
of Compulsory Licenses on Patents 2 (2007), available at 
http://www.keionline.org/misc-docs/recent_cls_8mar07.pdf. 
79 See TRIPS, supra note 20, art. 31(b). 
80 Id. 
81 Id. Additionally, the scope and duration of use must be limited to the purpose for 
which it was authorized and use must be non-exclusive and non-assignable. Id. art. 31(c)–
(e). 
82 See Nardi, supra note 60. 
83 TRIPS, supra note 20, art. 31(f). 
84 See id. 
85 Matthew Royle, Compulsory Licensing and Access to Drugs, Pharma Marketletter 
(U.K.), Dec. 17, 2007 (on file with author). 
86 See TRIPS, supra note 20, art. 31(f). 
87 See Nardi, supra note 60. 
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D. The Doha Declaration of 2001 
 In 2001, the WTO took initial steps to respond to the problem Ar-
ticle 31(f) posed.88 On November 14, following the WTO’s Ministerial 
Conference at Doha, Qatar, the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement 
and Public Health was issued.89 This is colloquially referred to as the 
Doha Declaration.90 The Doha Declaration did not set out specific solu-
tions, but rather publicly recognized problems and uncertainty with 
TRIPS and committed to developing remedies.91 The ministers agreed 
that TRIPS should be interpreted and implemented in a way that sup-
ports public health.92 In addition, they committed the WTO to creating 
flexibility for countries unable to manufacture pharmaceuticals domes-
tically.93 Paragraph six of the Declaration reads: 
 We recognize that WTO Members with insufficient or no 
manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could 
face difficulties in making effective use of compulsory licens-
ing under the TRIPS Agreement. We instruct the Council for 
TRIPS to find an expeditious solution to this problem and to 
report to the General Council before the end of 2002.94 
 In making this declaration the WTO ministers took the opportu-
nity to encourage member-states’ right to make use of Article 31, and 
reiterated their prerogative to circumvent patent rights in order to se-
cure better domestic access to necessary medicines.95 
                                                                                                                      
88 See Doha Declaration, supra note 28, ¶¶ 4, 6. 
89 Id. ¶¶ 1–7. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. ¶ 4. 
93 Doha Declaration, supra note 28, ¶ 5. 
94 Id. ¶ 6. 
95 Id. ¶¶ 4–6. Paragraphs four and five read: 
 4. The TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent Members from 
taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our 
commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and 
should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO 
Members’ right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access 
to medicines for all. In this connection, we reaffirm the right of WTO Mem-
bers to use, to the full, the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, which provide 
flexibility for this purpose. 
 5. Accordingly and in the light of paragraph 4 above, while maintaining 
our commitments in the TRIPS Agreement, we recognize that these flexibil-
ities include: (a) In applying the customary rules of interpretation of public 
international law, each provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the 
light of the object and purpose of the Agreement as expressed, in particular, 
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E. The Waiver of 2003 
 Two years later, on August 30, 2003, the WTO General Council 
announced a solution.96 The solution, in the form of an interim waiver, 
allows developed countries to export medicines to needier countries 
with national health problems.97 Article 31bis, eponymously “Paragraph 
Six,” amends Article 31 to allow compulsory export licenses for “prod-
ucts of the pharmaceutical sector needed to address the public health 
problems.”98 
 In contrast with Article 31(f)—which restricts compulsory licenses 
to internal use—Article 31bis authorizes a developed member-state to 
compel compulsory licenses from its own manufacturers, create ge-
neric versions of medications, and export those medications to coun-
tries in need.99 An exporting member must devise a license designating 
that it will: produce only the amount necessary to meet the needs of 
the importing member, export the entirety of the production to the 
specified country, clearly identify products as generic versions under 
this exception (including distinguishing the products through special 
packaging, coloring, and/or shaping), post on a website the quantities 
being supplied to each destination and the distinguishing features of 
the generic product.100 
 On its end, an importing member must specify the names and 
expected quantities of product needed and, if the desired medicine is 
patented in its territory, confirm that it has issued a compulsory li-
                                                                                                                      
in its objectives and principles; (b) Each Member has the right to grant com-
pulsory licences [sic] and the freedom to determine the grounds upon which 
such licences [sic] are granted; (c) Each Member has the right to determine 
what constitutes a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme ur-
gency, it being understood that public health crises, including those relating 
to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can represent a na-
tional emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency; [and] (d) The 
effect of the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement that are relevant to the ex-
haustion of intellectual property rights is to leave each Member free to estab-
lish its own regime for such exhaustion without challenge, subject to the MFN 
and national treatment provisions of Articles 3 and 4. 
Id. ¶¶ 4–5. 
96 WTO General Council, supra note 32. The WTO Director-General praised the result, 
commenting that “it proves once and for all that the organization can handle humanitar-
ian as well as trade concerns.” Press Release, World Trade Org., Decision Removes Final 
Patent Obstacle to Cheap Drug Imports (Aug. 30, 2003) [hereinafter WTO Aug. 30, 2003 
Press Release], available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres03_e/pr350_e.htm. 
97 WTO Aug. 30, 2003 Press Release, supra note 96. 
98 WTO General Council, supra note 32. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. ¶ 2(b)(i)–(iii). 
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cense.101 In addition, an importing member-state must fulfill one of 
two conditions: it must be a least-developed country, or it must make a 
convincing case that it has insufficient or no manufacturing capacity 
for the product it seeks.102 All WTO members are eligible to import 
medicines under Article 31bis.103 
 The provision immediately, however, was resisted.104 Right away, 
twenty-three members, all developed countries, voluntarily vowed not 
to use the system to import.105 Others committed to only using the pro-
vision in real emergencies.106 Some developed countries urged institut-
ing constraints on the scope of covered diseases.107 The United States, 
for one, specifically sought to restrict application to HIV/AIDS, ma-
laria, tuberculosis, and a few other specific diseases.108 The European 
Commission suggested making a list of “grave” public health prob-
lems.109 Pharmaceutical companies generally oppose compulsory li-
censing, claiming that it hurts research and development for new medi-
cines.110 
 Conversely, developing countries worked to expand the defini-
tion of eligible diseases and treatments.111 This time, the developing 
countries were most successful in negotiations.112 The resulting waiver 
defined the covered subject matter broadly, and permitted compul-
sory licensing for all products in “the pharmaceutical sector needed 
to address the public health problems as recognized in paragraph 1 of 
                                                                                                                      
101 Id. ¶ 2(a)(i), (iii). 
102 Id. ¶ 2(a)(ii). 
103 WTO General Council, supra note 32, ¶ 1(b). 
104 Id.; Abbott & Reichman, supra note 20, at 933. 
105 WTO General Council, supra note 32, ¶ 1(b). These countries are: Australia, Aus-
tria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. Id. n.3. 
106 WTO Aug. 30, 2003 Press Release, supra note 96. These countries include: Hong 
Kong, Israel, Korea, Kuwait, Macao China, Mexico, Qatar, Singapore, Chinese Taipei, Tur-
key, and the United Arab Emirates. Id. 
107 Abbott & Reichman, supra note 20, at 936. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. This idea failed, in part, because it could be arbitrary for trade officials to de-
cide which diseases were covered and which were not. Id. 
110 Id. at 953–54. 
111 Abbott & Reichman, supra note 20, at 953–54 
112 Id. at 937. The scope of medications and treatments covered in the pending 
amendment is broad. WTO General Council, supra note 32, ¶ 1(a). 
100 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 29:85 
the Doha Declaration.”113 Paragraph 1 has no limitation on specific 
diseases or medicines.114 
 The United States also advocated that the waiver “not be [used] 
for commercial gain.”115 This, too, was rejected by developing coun-
tries.116 The WTO chair of the General Council did, however, issue a 
statement that, “members recognize that the system that will be estab-
lished by the Decision should be used in good faith to protect the 
public health and . . . not be an instrument to pursue industrial or 
commercial policy objectives.”117 
F. The Amendment of 2005: Article 31bis 
 On December 6, 2005, the waiver became the first-ever amend-
ment to TRIPS.118 Designated as Article 31bis, and alternatively identi-
fied as a “Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement,” the amendment 
will be permanently attached to the TRIPS agreement following Arti-
cle 31 once it is duly accepted.119 It will be accepted when two-thirds 
of WTO-members ratify it.120 
                                                                                                                      
113 Abbott & Reichman, supra note 20, at 937. 
114 WTO General Council, supra note 32, ¶ 1(a). Paragraph 1 of the Doha Agreement 
reads, “[w]e recognize the gravity of the public health problems afflicting many develop-
ing and least developed countries, especially those resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, 
malaria and other epidemics.” Doha Declaration, supra note 28, ¶ 1. 
115 Abbott & Reichman, supra note 20, at 946. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 945–46. 
118 WTO Dec. 6, 2005, supra note 34 (noting that the proposed amendment marked “the 
first time a core WTO agreement [was] amended”); World Trade Organization, Amendment 
of the TRIPS Agreement, Decision of Dec. 6, 2005, WT/L/641, (Dec. 6, 2005) [hereinafter 
WTO Decision of Dec. 6, 2005]. The amendment is a compromise among members repre-
senting interests of 1) researching and developing, 2) manufacturing and developing, 3) 
prescribing and treating, and 4) advocating on behalf of patients. Abbott & Reichman, supra 
note 20, at 984. 
119 WTO Decision of Dec. 6, 2005, supra note 118; WTO Aug. 30, 2003 Press Release, 
supra note 96. 
120 World Trade Org., Members Accepting Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, http:// 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/amendment_e.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2008) [herein-
after WTO, Members Accepting Amendment]. In April 2008, Taiwan was the latest to ap-
prove the amendment. Ben Shankland, TRIPS Amendment to Ease Generic Drug Exports Gets 
Cabinet Approval in Taiwan, World Markets Research Centre, Apr. 3, 2008 (on file with 
author). The country still needs to adopt it. Id. The proposed amendment was initially 
open for acceptance until December 1, 2007. WTO Decision of Dec. 6, 2005, supra note 
118. The final date was later amended to December 31, 2009. World Trade Org., Decision 
of the General Council of 18 December 2007, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement—
Extension of the Period for the Acceptance by Members of the Protocol Amending the 
TRIPS Agreement, WT/L/711 (2007) [hereinafter WTO, Extension for Acceptance]. 
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III. Use of the Amendment 
A. Adoption and Creation of Corresponding Legislation 
 Member-states have slowly, but gradually, adopted the amend-
ment.121 By August 2008, forty-four WTO member-states— approxi-
mately twenty-nine percent—had ratified Article 31bis.122 Canada, in 
May 2004, was the first to implement law to carry out the amendment’s 
mission.123 The Canadian government passed An Act to Amend the Patent 
Act and Food and Drug Act, legislation authorizing Canada’s Commis-
sioner of Patents to grant compulsory licenses permitting the manufac-
ture and export of low-cost versions of patented pharmaceuticals.124 To 
facilitate this task, the Act established a legal framework, titled Canada’s 
Access to Medicines Regime (CAMR), which took form the following 
year.125 
 CAMR’s goal is to facilitate timely access to generic, low-cost ver-
sions of patented drugs to least-developed and developing countries, to 
fight HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, and other diseases.126 In keep-
ing with the WTO decision’s guidelines, CAMR strives to present a 
process that is as transparent as possible.127 It defines safety, effective-
ness, quality, and issuance requirements for drugs to be exported.128 
                                                                                                                      
121 See WTO, Members Accepting Amendment, supra note 120. 
122 Id. In ascending order, member-states who have accepted the amendment are as 
follows: United States (December 2005), Switzerland (September 2006), El Salvador (Sep-
tember 2006), Republic of Korea ( January 2007), Norway (February 2007), India (March 
2007), Philippines (March 2007), Israel (August 2007), Japan (August 2007), Australia 
(September 2007), Singapore (September 2007); Hong Kong (November 2007), China 
(November 2007), the twenty-seven European Communities (November 2007), Mauritius 
(April 2008), Egypt (April 2008), Mexico (May 2008) and Jordan (August 2008). Id. Be-
cause less than half the necessary member-states had endorsed the waiver, the WTO ex-
tended the deadline from December 2007 to December 2009. WTO, Extension for Accep-
tance, supra note 120. The document granting the extension explains that acceptance by 
two-thirds of members “is taking longer than initially foreseen.” Id. 
123 Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime (CAMR), Background, http://camr-rcam.hc- 
sc.gc.ca/intro/context_e.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2008) [hereinafter CAMR, Background]. 
124 Id. 
125 Douglas Clark & Brigitte Zirger, Government of Canada, Canada’s Access 
to Medicines Regime—Consultation Paper 2, (2006), http://camr-rcam.hc-sc.gc.ca/ 
review-reviser/camr_rcam_consult_e.pdf. The act is also known as “Bill C-9” and the “Jean 
Chrétien Pledge to Africa.” CAMR, Background, supra note 123; Clark & Zirger, supra, at 
13 n.3. 
126 CAMR, Background, supra note 123. 
127 Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime (CAMR), Features of the Regime, http:// 
camr-rcam.hc-sc.gc.ca/intro/regime_e.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2008) [hereinafter CAMR, 
Features of the Regime]. 
128 Id. 
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Generally, it limits eligible pharmaceuticals to the World Health Or-
ganization’s Model List of Essential Medicines, but reserves the right to 
add products to the list.129 CAMR permits exportation to all countries, 
regardless of WTO-member status.130 In order to distinguish them from 
the patented versions sold in Canada, CAMR requires that the generic 
drugs be distinguished by special markings, coloring, and labeling.131 If 
the cost of the resulting generic product turns out to be more than 
twenty-five percent of the cost of the patented version in Canada, the 
framework authorizes patent holders to challenge a compulsory license 
in court.132 It also sanctions Health Canada to expeditiously review re-
quests for the drugs in order to avoid delay in emergencies.133 
 Norway, the Netherlands, India, Korea, and China followed suit.134 
In June 2006, the European Union (EU) passed Regulation 
816/2006.135 Article One of Regulation 816/2006 similarly “establishes 
a procedure for the grant of compulsory licenses in relation to patents 
concerning the manufacture and sale of pharmaceutical products, 
when such products are intended for export to eligible importing 
countries in need of such products in order to address public health 
problems.”136 Article Four permits exportation of generic versions of 
patented medications to all countries with insufficient manufacturing 
capacity and any country recognized by the U.N. as being a least-
developed country (LDC).137 
                                                                                                                      
129 Id. An up-to-date version of the World Health Organization’s Model List of Essen-
tial Medicines is available at http://www.who.int/medicines/publications/essentialmedi- 
cines/en/. The concept of essential drugs came about in the 1970s, and the first list was 
published in 1975. WHO, WHO Medicines Strategy, supra note 5, at 16. 
130 See CAMR, Features of the Regime, supra note 127. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. Health Canada is Canada’s federal health department. Government of Canada, 
About Health Canada, http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/ahc-asc/index_e.html (last visited Oct. 10, 
2008). 
134 Clark & Zirger, supra note 125, at 21. Norway passed legislation in June 2004, the 
Netherlands in December 2004, India in January 2005, Korea in December 2005, China in 
January 2006, and the EU in June 2006. Id. Switzerland drafted an amendment in Novem-
ber 2005, but it was never enacted. Id. 
135 Council Regulation 816/2006, Compulsory Licensing of Patents Related to the 
Manufacture of Pharmaceutical Products for Export to Countries with Public Health Prob-
lems 2006 O.J. (L 157) 1. 
136 Id. at 2. 
137 Id. at 3. The U.N. List of LDCs is available at http://www.un.org/special-rep/ 
ohrlls/ldc/list.htm. 
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B. Use 
 Despite the handful of countries that have adjusted or created 
domestic laws to comply with the amendment, and even more that have 
articulated support for it, to date, only two sets of countries have cho-
sen to make use of Article 31bis.138 
1. Canada and Rwanda 
 On July 19, 2007, Rwanda took the first step in the Article 31bis 
process and informed the WTO of its intention to import compulsory-
licensed pharmaceuticals for public health reasons.139 In September 
2007, Canada became the first country to issue a compulsory export 
license and granted Apotex, a Canadian generic drug manufacturer, 
permission to supply TriAvir, a combination AIDS drug, to Rwanda.140 
 In keeping with the conditions of the Canadian legislation, Apotex 
reported failed attempts at negotiations with TriAvir’s patent holders, 
but will go forward with the license, and pay nominal royalties, which 
are calculated based on the value of the medication and Rwanda’s 
ranking on the U.N. Human Development Index (UNHDI).141 If the 
patent-holder is dissatisfied with the amount paid or any of the other 
                                                                                                                      
138 See Sarah Hiddleston, Manufacture of Patented Drugs for Export Under Study, Hindu 
(India), Feb. 24, 2008, at 9. 
139 Royle, supra note 85. An estimated 2.1 percent of Rwandans are infected with HIV. 
Higgins, supra note 50. The Rwandan government used the World Bank model forms to 
issue its notification. Abbott & Reichman, supra note 20, at 941–42. 
140 John Boscariol, Canada Is First to Grant WTO Compulsory Licence for Export of Generic 
Drug, Mondaq Bus. Briefing, Nov. 2, 2007, available at http://www.mondaq.com/arti- 
cle.asp?articleid=53944. Apotex plans on distributing 250,000 doses. TriAvir is a fixed-dose, 
three-combination cocktail consisting of zidovudine, lamivudine, and nevirapine. Id. Brit-
ain’s GlaxoSmithKline owns the patents on the first two antiretrovirals; Germany’s Boe-
hringer Ingelheim owns the third. Id. Apotex’s website documents its mission and posts 
the statement: 
 In the quest to bring quality affordable medications to the world, Apotex 
was the only company to research and develop a Canadian made triple com-
bination AIDS drug under Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime (CAMR). As 
part of our objective to give back to our communities we decided that we 
would offer Apo-TriAvir on a “not for profit” basis to countries that would ap-
ply through the CAMR. Why are we doing this? It’s the right thing to do to al-
leviate human suffering and save the lives of thousands of people who would 
otherwise die without access to life saving medicines. 
Apotex.com, http://www.apotex.com/apotriavir/abouttriavir.asp (last visited Oct. 10, 2008). 
The company plans to import around 260,000 packs of TriAvir over the span of two years. 
Royle, supra note 85. The generic version will be called Apo-triAvir. Boscariol, supra. 
141 Boscariol, supra note 140. Rwanda has a low UNHDI ranking, so the royalties paid 
will likely be low. Id. 
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terms of the license, it may appeal to the Federal Court to terminate 
the license.142 To ensure a successful appeal, the patent-holder must 
demonstrate that the relevant medication had been re-imported to 
Canada, exported to a country other than Rwanda, or prove that the 
generic drug is being sold for greater than twenty-five percent than the 
cost of the patented original.143 CAMR seeks to guarantee that generic 
exports are not commercial in nature; that is, the generic manufacturer 
must not be making a business out of its right to the compulsory li-
cense.144 Furthermore, Apotex is obligated to report to the patent-
holder the quantity of medication in each export and the name of the 
parties that will handle the medication when it is delivered to the re-
ceiving country.145 In September 2008, Apotex was set to send seven 
million doses of the generic drug.146 
2. India and Nepal 
 In early 2008, Nepal became the second country to apply for an 
import-license under Article 31bis.147 Indian drug-manufacturer Natco 
Pharma responded, and sought out a compulsory license to produce 
generic versions of two anti-cancer drugs.148 Natco has proposed to 
manufacture 45,000 doses of the drugs, and, subject to Article 31(h), 
remunerate the patent-holders a five percent royalty.149 The Indian 
government is currently considering the matter.150 At the end of Feb-
ruary 2008, the proceedings were indefinitely postponed to permit one 
of the patent-holders the opportunity to lobby for the right to attend 
the full hearing.151 As of early April, the hearing was still delayed.152 It is 
                                                                                                                      
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Clark & Zirger, supra note 125, at 6. 
145 Boscariol, supra note 140. 
146 TRIPS Mechanism Set to Fail as Apotex Ships ARV, Pharma Marketletter, Sept. 23, 
2008 (on file with author). 
147 Hiddleston, supra note 138. 
148 Id. The two drugs are erlotinib, owned by Swiss company Roche, and sunitinib, 
owned by the U.S. company Pfizer. Id. 
149 Id.; TRIPS, supra note 20, art. 31(h). 
150 Hiddleston, supra note 138. In India, compulsory licenses are governed by S.92A of 
the Patent Act, which provides that a license will be issued to supply medicines “to any 
country having insufficient or no manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector for 
the concerned product to address public health problems.” S.92(A)(1), The Patents 
(Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2005. 
151 “Secret” Compulsory License Hearings in India for Roche’s Tarceva Under TRIPS Rule, 
Pharma Marketletter, Mar. 18, 2008 (on file with author). 
152 See id. 
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likely that the license will be granted if Natco shows that Nepal lacks 
the local manufacturing capacity to produce generic drugs and if its 
order request clearly articulates that the drugs will be used for emer-
gency need.153 
C. Disuse 
1. Alternatives 
 The majority of member-states are not seeking to use Article 
31bis.154 A country in need that does not use the TRIPS provision has 
limited options in procuring low-cost, life-saving drugs.155 One option 
is to solicit drugs from countries that are not WTO-members and do 
not have patent protection for pharmaceuticals.156 In November 2006 
and May 2007, Thailand and Brazil, respectively, took steps to import 
efavirenz, a cocktail to treat AIDS symptoms, from India to supply 
200,000 people for five years.157 However, this practice cannot con-
tinue much longer, as India is a WTO member and, under interna-
tional law, must comply with the TRIPS terms in the near future.158 
 A second option is to make use of domestic manufacturers’ pat-
ented products by using the already-accepted Article 31 to issue com-
pulsory licenses.159 In January 2007, Thailand granted its drug manu-
facturers the rights to produce generic versions of Kaletra, an AIDS 
drug.160 
2. Obstacles 
 Countries may not be utilizing the TRIPS provision because of 
the obstacles it involves.161 In the aftermath of Canada’s application 
process, the Canadian firm Apotex has been openly critical of the 
procedure for obtaining a compulsory export license.162 It says the 
                                                                                                                      
153 Id. 
154 See WTO, Members Accepting Amendment, supra note 120. 
155 See, e.g., Royle, supra note 85; Abbott & Reichman, supra note 20, at 950–51. 
156 Abbott & Reichman, supra note 20, at 950–51. 
157 Royle, supra note 85. Merck & Co. holds the efavirenz patent. Id. The waiver deci-
sion did not apply to the government-issued licenses issued by Brazil and Thailand. Abbott 
& Reichman, supra note 20, at 950–51. 
158 Westerhaus & Castro, supra note 10, at 1233. 
159 Santoro, supra note 47. 
160 Id. Abbot Laboratories owns the patent for Kaletra. Id. 
161 See, e.g., Royle, supra note 85. 
162 Id. 
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system was “unnecessarily complex,” that it “did not adequately repre-
sent the interests of those who required treatment, and that the proc-
ess delayed the act of supplying for over a year.163 On the other side, 
one of the patent-holders issued a press release announcing that it 
“not only does not object to the grant of this authorization under 
Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime but does support the CIPO 
(Canada Patent Office) decision in this respect.”164 
 But bad press from those who have used Article 31bis is not 
enough to explain why countries are not issuing compulsory li-
censes.165 Developing countries may lack the legal and technical ex-
pertise necessary to draft appropriate legislation in compliance of 
TRIPS.166 Membership in the WTO requires that member-states ad-
here to all major WTO treaties, including TRIPS.167 In order to take 
advantage of TRIPS’s exceptions, a member-state must construct its 
own laws to come into compliance with the other terms of TRIPS.168 
For example, to comply with TRIPS, the United States had to increase 
its term of patent protection from seventeen years to the twenty years 
mandated by TRIPS.169 The agreement gives countries, depending on 
their levels of economic development, a certain term of years in which 
to comply with TRIPS’s requirements, and some still have not crafted 
the required legislation.170 
 WTO rules might be unmanageable and too complicated for poor 
countries to interpret and utilize.171 The process for issuing a compul-
sory license is arduous, as evidenced by Apotex’s public comments.172 
First, there must be a national emergency, a term which the WTO does 
not define.173 Once an emergency has been identified, the country 
must request a license from the patent-holder and attempt to agree on 
licensing terms.174 Many patent-holders have traditionally taken advan-
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tage of this requirement and stretched negotiations on for years.175 If 
no agreement is reached, the country must jump through substantial 
administrative hoops before it can issue a compulsory license.176 
 The exact procedures of issuing a compulsory license remain un-
clear.177 As evidenced by international disapproval when Thailand 
tried to navigate the exception, countries seem to have little support 
in figuring out the rules and processes.178 Many of the provisions are 
undefined, and, until recently, have gone untested.179 For example, 
the term “developing country” remains without a universal definition: 
EU Commissioner Peter Mandelson argued that Thailand did not fit 
into this category, but the issue was never concretely resolved.180 
3. Resistance 
 Experience shows that when a country does decide to invoke Ar-
ticle 31, it is received with animosity.181 When Thailand issued a com-
pulsory license in 2007, both the United States and the European Un-
ion condemned its actions, censuring the country and putting it on a 
“priority watch list.”182 
 Furthermore, countries, developed and developing alike, don’t 
want to make enemies of powerful drug companies.183 MNCs are 
powerful international entities that bring jobs and economic stabil-
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ity.184 To cross them might mean losing them.185 Developing countries 
and least-developed countries are resistant to bypassing patents of 
powerful pharmaceuticals because they do not want to scare them off 
or detract future investors.186 Governments of countries plagued with 
disease are faced with a double-edged sword.187 They feel the need to 
help their people, yet do not want to blacklist themselves with corpo-
rations that could affect their economic sustainability in the future.188 
 Pharmaceutical companies have many reasons to feel threatened 
by compulsory licensing.189 One concern is that countries that take ad-
vantage of compulsory licensing will resell the drugs in developed 
countries to make a profit instead of providing them to their own peo-
ple.190 Pharmaceutical companies are also concerned that if manufac-
turers lower their prices in some countries, political pressure will 
mount in developed countries for the companies to lower their prices 
to comparable levels.191 Additionally, companies fear that once one de-
veloping country uses Article 31, many other countries will follow suit, 
and create a domino effect of issuing cheap medicines.192 Seventy per-
cent of the world’s forty million people currently infected with HIV/ 
AIDS live in Africa, a continent full of countries eligible to use Article 
31.193 Pharmaceutical companies worry that if one African country suc-
cessfully navigates the exception, the rest will follow.194 
IV. How to Get Drugs to Countries in Need 
 Rwandan Jennifer Uwimana is just one success story that shows 
the life-saving effects of accessing necessary treatments.195 In 2006, at 
age one, Uwimana suffered from AIDS and tuberculosis and weighed 
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just forty percent of normal weight.196 Because her mother was able to 
get Uwimana to a clinic, the toddler now has a healthy weight and re-
ceives treatment for her HIV infection.197 
A. Lower Drug Prices 
 The cost of treatments for infectious diseases must be reduced.198 
New York University economist William Easterly believes millions of 
people every year in developing countries are not dying from infectious 
diseases such as malaria and tuberculosis, but rather from conditions 
that do not have scientific names such as lack of basic prerequisites 
necessary for delivering care.199 In order to get the international com-
munity to take these conditions seriously, Easterly wants to assign im-
portant-sounding Latin names to situations such as “missing health 
worker,” or “stolen drugs.”200 Another killer, that he does not mention, 
might as well be “expensive treatments.”201 
 To ease pain and suffering, drugs need to be made more afford-
able.202 There are many cases that prove that infectious diseases can be 
eradicated through providing adequate medication to those in need.203 
The program of major pharmaceutical giant, Merck, to tackle oncho-
cerciasis (river blindness which is spread by black flies in parts of Af-
rica) has treated over 530 million cases with its antiparasitic ivermectin, 
and has prevented 40,000 cases per year.204 The efforts of the Carter 
Center to confront cases of Guinea worm (a parasite that slowly burns 
through the skin) have reduced the number of infections from 3.5 mil-
lion in 1986 to 25,000 in 2007.205 However, there are only so many pri-
vate donors and good-will grants.206 A more comprehensive plan must 
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be established to ensure the availability of low-cost generic medica-
tions.207 
B. Recognize That Compulsory Licensing Does Not Stifle Innovation 
 A fundamental theory of patent law is to provide market-driven 
incentives, that is, full economic rewards, to a creator in order to get 
him or her to devote time and money to developing an innovative 
product.208 Pharmaceutical manufacturers argue that compulsory li-
censing undermines the production of new drugs by stifling innova-
tion.209 
 At first glance, this assertion makes sense.210 However, it has fre-
quently proven to be a weak argument.211 First, studies demonstrate 
that there is no uniform decline in scientific innovation when compul-
sory licensing is put in play.212 Second, more than half of all retroviral 
drugs, such as the one replicated by Thailand, were researched com-
pletely on funding from U.S. grants.213 In the United States, pharma-
ceutical companies receive extensive tax breaks on research and devel-
opment of medicines.214 These studies have revealed that pharmaceuti-
cal companies actually spend seventy-five percent less than what they 
claim to spend in order to create a drug.215 Furthermore, of the twenty-
one most influential drugs introduced between 1965 and 1992, only 
five were developed entirely by the private sector.216 Third, current pat-
ent protection has not created incentives to develop drugs most 
needed by developing countries, such as medicines to treat malaria and 
tuberculosis.217 
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 Indeed, between 1975 and 1997, only 13 out of 1223 new drugs 
were specifically targeted towards diseases disproportionately affecting 
developing countries.218 There is little economic incentive to cater to 
antiretroviral drug research in developing countries as opposed to 
more profitable markets such as that of the United States.219 Other rea-
sons large pharmaceutical companies have little interest in patent pro-
tection in the developing world are costs of litigation and poor judicial 
systems.220 
 In a study published in 2003, attorney Colleen Chien explored 
whether past compulsory licenses over drugs were accompanied by a 
reduction in innovation, and found that in five of the six cases she stud-
ied, there was no measurable decline.221 
 Furthermore, the argument that patents are provided to encour-
age innovation and ensure further research and development is get-
ting in the way of accomplishing the purpose for which these medi-
cines should be created.222 That is, medicines should be made to treat 
sickness and disease. But if these same medicines are unavailable to 
those who can most benefit from them (because of high costs or other 
factors), the reasons for their existence cease to matter.223 
 Existing research suggests that two factors must be present for 
compulsory licenses to affect innovation: predictability of the license 
being granted and the significance of the market affected by the li-
cense.224 
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C. Encourage Compulsory Licensing 
 Compulsory licensing is one way, both directly and indirectly, to 
advance access to medicines.225 Directly, compulsory licensing bypasses 
a patent holder’s IPRs and allows for cheaper, generic versions to be 
manufactured.226 Rwanda and Canada, and most recently, Nepal and 
India, have sought to use this route of obtaining affordable medica-
tions.227 Indirectly, compulsory licensing often forces patent-holders to 
lower their prices significantly in order to remain the sole provider of a 
medicine.228 In some cases, the pending amendment worries pharma-
ceutical companies.229 As a result, backed by the threat of compulsory 
licensing, poorer governments have been enabled to negotiate lower 
prices with drug companies.230 Thailand, for example, was able to pro-
duce low-cost generic drugs by dishonoring a patent.231 By doing so, 
multinational pharmaceutical companies dropped their prices signifi-
cantly.232 
 Another sixty WTO members are still required to ratify Article 
31bis, but, along with the rest of Article 31, it has potential to increase 
drug accessibility.233 
D. Follow the Lead of Canada 
 Canada appears to be an achievable prototype to follow since the 
country has a vibrant history of freely and comprehensively issuing 
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compulsory licenses on patented pharmaceuticals.234 Studies show 
that innovation in Canada has not been curbed, and, in the past cen-
tury, the country has been able to build a strong domestic generic 
drug industry in order to stop patent abuse.235 Making use of its his-
tory in dealing with patent-holders and generic manufacturers, in im-
plementing the provisions of Article 31bis, the Canadian government 
engaged in meaningful discussions with major players that would be 
affected by its decision.236 
 The United States’s experience with compulsory licenses is mark-
edly different.237 In a 1980 decision, the Supreme Court noted that us-
age of compulsory licensing in the American patent system was rare 
and was never widely adopted.238 That said, the United States fre-
quently uses compulsory licensing as a remedy to antitrust violations.239 
The United States has also threatened to use Article 31 many times in 
the past.240 And the United States is an important player in the phar-
maceutical world. In the 1990s, one half of the global pharmaceutical 
innovation, 370 new drugs, was created by U.S. industry.241 
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Conclusion 
 Millions of lives are unnecessarily lost every year because of the 
price of medications. With studies that show that compulsory licensing 
does not significantly inhibit innovation or production, these prices are 
unnecessarily high as well. In order to improve world health, all coun-
tries with people suffering from treatable diseases must be able to afford 
medicines that can save their lives. Though the United States, for one, 
has always used a market-based approach in encouraging the creation 
of new medicines, financial reward is not the only inducement that in-
centivizes innovation. In an essay and art contest—titled, What I Really 
Want That Money Can’t Buy— “an overwhelming number [of entrants] 
identified world peace as the number one thing they want that money 
can’t buy.”242 Improving the quality of life and ultimately saving lives for 
the people of just one African country suffering from treatable diseases 
is enough to qualify as creating world peace. 
 The privately-funded and good-will projects that have been car-
ried out show that putting medications into the hands of sick people 
will save lives. Small pox has been eradicated and measles is at an all-
time low. 
 The lobbying powers of pharmaceutical companies will always be 
mammoth and intimidating. It is up to the developed countries, such 
as the United States, to issue compulsory licenses and help provide 
for suffering people. Developing countries will understandably be 
hesitant in standing up to these interests, and it is up to the wealthier 
and more influential to care for those in need. 
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